This is the statement of Colonel Abu Taher of the Bangladesh Army. It was given before the special Martial Law Tribunal convened inside Dacca Central Jail between 21 - July 17, 1976. The charges against Taher were mutiny and treason. The testimony has never before been published. The trial of Taher was held in conditions of complete secrecy. Newspapers were proscribed from reporting on what was widely considered the most important political trial in Bangladesh since its independence. This testimony is now being published in spite of the ban which still exists inside Bangladesh on any details of the case. The text was obtained from sources inside Bangladesh's Martial Law Administration who wish at this time to remain anonymous.

 The Testimony of Colonel Mohammed Abu Taher before the Special Military Tribunal Number 1. 

Colonel Abu Taher: 

'" The charges against me are very vague. I ask the tribunal to specify exactly what the prosecution witnesses has said. The charges of conspiracy are baseless and absolutely false. I an innocent. 

I have made an application to the Tribunal. The application's fate is best known to the Chairman. Yes, I have summoned - the President, Justice A.S.M. Sayem, Major-General Ziaur Rahman, Rear-Admiral M.H. Khan, Air Vice-Marshal M.G. Tawab, and General M.A.G. Osmani. They should all be bought here and made to give evidence. I should like to add one more name. Major-General Ershad. And I would also like to state something more.

It is part of the recorded document of this tribunal that there was an uprising of soldiers in Dacca's Cantonement on my call on the night of  the 6th and 7th of November 1975, and thereby the malicious objectives of a group of conspirators was frustrated. Major-General Ziaur Rahman was freed from his captivity and the sovereignty of this country was preserved. If this is the act which constitutes treason, then I am guilty.

And to establish this fact there was no need to go through the unpleasant torture and threats which have been pursued against me since the 21st june 1976. This fact is well-known to justice Sayem and his goverment which by our efforts we installed on the 7th November 1975. There were agreed principles that all political prisoners be releases; political activities be allowed; a general election be held; and a people's government be established. This fact is well-known to my fellow countrymen who will remember it with gratitude.

It is an insult to this nation that there is now an attempt to try me inside this jail and by such an inferior court like the present one. You have no right to judge me.

I recall here the night of the 25th March 1971 when the Pakistani Army unleashed brutal attacks against our people. We had no choice, but to win this war which was thrust on us. Had we lost a worse kind of slavery would have been imposed upon us. The Pakistani Military Junta did not make it a secret when they announced in the newspapers that Bengalis did not deserve any higher education. Their education could be confined to Madrasha Education. Bengalis are unpatriotic. Their culture is inferior. They should be compelled to speak in one language Urdu. 

Those were days of trial for us who were then in West Pakistan. At that time I did not hesitate to respond to the nation's call. The barbaric purpose of the Military Junta was not unknown to us who were in West Pakistan, when from General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army the message went out: ' Burn everything, kill everyone in sight.'

I had no hesitate to escape from Pakistan to join the Liberation War. It is not unknown to the Chairman of this tribunal that I was not a back bencher in the Pakistan Army. I was commissioned in the Baluch Regiment and later I joined the Special Services group, an elite para-commando force in the Pakistan Army. Six long years I served with this elite unit. I took part in the 1965 Indo-Pak war in the Kashmir and Sialkot sectors. I bear the sign of wounds from that war in my body.

I am the only Bengali officer who was awarded a Maroon Parachute Wing and I had to my credit 135 static line jumps. In recognition of my service I was sent to the United States to attend different courses. I was awarded the Ranger Award by the Ranger Training command, Fort Benning, Columbus, Georgia. I am an Honours Graduate from the Special Forces officer Training Institute, Fort Bragg, North carolina. Since I am on trial, I might as well mention here that such service distinctions were never achieved by any Bengali officer until that time. In the month of December 1970, I returned from the States.

On my return I found the General Election was over and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's party, the Awami League, had won the election with an over whelming majority - and that created trouble in the politics of Pakistan. It was clear to me that the Military Junta and Mr. Zulfikuar Ali Bhutto, a curse upon the politics of Pakistan, would not allow the Awami Leage its rightful claim to power. I also knew Bengalis would not let it go unchallenged. Sensing trouble, I sent my wife in the month of February to my home town, Mymensingh.

On the 25th March I was at Quetta attending a Senior Technical Course in the school of Infantry and Tactics. When I heard the announcement of General Yahya Khan over the radio on the evening of the 26th of March, I cane to know what a catastrophe had fallen on my people. For the whole night I walked on the lonely roads of Quetta.

On the 28th March the course was called off and we were ordered to report to our unit. The next day as we were preparing to leave Quetta, I was detained and charges were bought against me that I expresses my displeasure regarding a trocities committed in the then East Pakistan.

At the time several junior officers, Lieutenants Second Lieutenants approached and sought my advice as to what they should do in this time. I told them in clear terms that their only concern was to escape from Pakistan and join the Liberation War. They also informed me that a few senior Bengali officers who were stationed at that time in Quetta had refused to talk to them; refused to entertain them, lest their loyalty be doubted by their master.

Some of these same Senior officers I find today holding important positions in the Armed Forces and they are now a party in this attempt to try me here. These officers before the 25th of March went all out to announce their acquaintance with Sheikh Mujib; after the 25th of March they termed him a traitor." 

Taher at this point is interrupted by the Tribunal's chairman. He is told he is not be permitted to read such a statement. There is shouting and arguing in the courtroom. Taher tells the Chairman, Colonel Yusuf Haider, " If you do not give me the opportunity to depose of my statement, I had better keep silent. It truly must be a heinous act on my part to argue on behalf of myself before such an inferior officer." There are further arguments and finally after the intervention of Taher's lawers, he is permitted to continue. 

" Later I was happy to learn that among the junior officers I encouraged to escape, Second Lieutenant Noor and Second Lieutenant Eram were successful and joined the Liberation War.

At Quetta after a few days, due to the intervention of Major-General B.M. Mustafa, Commandant of the School of Infantry and Tactics with whom I had a good relationship, the charges were withdrawn, and I was allowed to move to the Khariar Cantonment. At Khariar I was attached to a medium regiment and not allowed to join my unit which was brought into the then East Pakistan to kill my own people. It was this unit which arrested Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. At Khariar I convinced Captain Delwar and Captain Patwari to escape with me. It was decided that a Bengali engineer stationed at Mirpur in Azad Kasmir would give us Shelter and arrange transport up to the border. At the appointed date and time we reached Mirpur. On our arrival, to my utter surprise we found the engineer had left with his family and the house was locked. That was the first time I came across the unpatriotic quality of Bengali gentry.

We spent the afternoon on the lawn of his house. At nightfall we took to the hills. My companions Captain Delwar and Captain Patwari were not used to rough hills and after a few hours they refused to proceed further. We were forced to come back to the Khariar Cantonment. After I was posted to the Baluch Regimental Centre at Abotabad.

In West Pakistan at the time there were about 1,000 Bengali officers. I approached many and tried to induce them to escape and join the Liberation War. But it was unfortunate to find that the patriotism of the Bengali gentry is confined to heated drawing-room discussion.

I was fortunate that of the lot, Major Ziauddin, at that time serving at General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, agreed to escape with me. Accordingly we made a plan. With all my savings I purchases a used car by which we could the border. Myself and Ziauddin started from Pindi and on our way we connected up with Captain Patwari from Jhelum. Since we had to pass some daylight hours, we went to Major Manjoor's house who was stationed at Sialkot Cantonement. To our good luck when he come to know about our escape plan, Mrs. Manjoor insisted upon escaping with us. Thereby Major Manjoor, his family, and his Bengali batman joined us. At nightfall we drove up to the border, abandoned the car, and walked across the border and reached India. 

Here I would like to mention Major Ziauddin. Later I will discuss him more. Following Liberation, he was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and commanded the Dacca Bridge. He also happens to be an accused in this case. Major Manjoor is now Brigadier Manjoor and is presently chief of General Staff of the Bangladesh Army. Captain Patwari, I believe, has become a Lieutenant-Colonel, if not a Colonel, Commanding a Battalion.

On joining the Liberation war I was asked by Colonel Osmani, C-in-C of our forces, to visit different sectors and find out weaknesses in the conduct of the fighting. The first sector Which I visited was Sector No. 11 comprising Mymensingh and Tangail Districts. Major-General Zia, now deputy chief Martial Law Administrator was at that time raising a brigade in the area. The sector was being commanded by Brigadier S. Singh[Indian Army].

It was a surprise to me that such an important sector was left to the command of an Indian officer. The important of that sector was enormous to hit Dacca. I made a decision to stay here. I thought it was useless to waste time moving in different sectors. Immediately we began organizing operations with local freedom fighters. Osmani was rather annoyed with me, but since I would not go back he was forced to appoint me commander of sector 11.

Within a short period the weaknesses in our conduct of the war could be easily pinpointed. First: we waged a war; the people waged a war; but there was no political leadership. Without political leadership, guerrilla warfare can never develop. And the Awami League failed to provide political leadership to our Liberation struggle.

Second: the command structure had no theoretical concept of guerrilla war. Few conventional officers like Colonel Osmani, Major Zia, Major Khaled, Major Safiullah, and others, had any understanding of the organization of a guerilla struggle. These conventional officers with their conventional military ideas were, in fact, a hindrance in the natural growth of guerrilla warfare.

Third:  the existing military leadership of the Liberation War was Scanty. Whatever adequately trained solders or officers we had were concentrated in regular force units. Independent units of freedom fighters were deprived of obtaining necessary military skills and leadership. This was due to the fact that the commanders of the Liberation Forces had no concept whatsoever of a Liberation struggle. Their only concern was to raise regular main force brigades to consolidate their own power. Had the two brigades of trained troops, one at Agartala under Khaled Mussaraf and the other at Meghalaya under Major Zia, been correctly deployed, we could have raised 20 divisions of peasant fighters within seven or eight months. This is the distinction between people's war and conventional war. This was not understood by Colonel Osmani. It is not correct to attempt to raise a regular force at an early stage of guerrilla struggle. At an appropriate time, a guerrilla force will be converted into a regular force."

Taher is interrupted again by the Tribunal. There is an argument in the court. The tribunal orders him to finish up. Taher says: "If you disturb me like this, it will be impossible for me to depose. I have seen many small men in my time, but none smaller than you."

"Fourth: the forces which developed spontaneously inside Bangladesh under the leadership of famous freedom fighters such as Major Afzar, Kazi Siddique, Hemayet, Baten - this form was the natural development of the forces struggling in our Liberation war. Unfortunately the regular military command under Colonel Osmani and the provisional government looked at the development of such a force with suspicion. Consequently, there was no co-ordination between the freedom fighters raised under Colonel Osmani and the force developing inside the country.

Fifth:  there was the evil influence of Indian's Border Security Force on our glorious freedom fighters. The B.S.F. of India due to their personal greed and lack of ideological understanding forced some of our fighters to participate in the looting of the houses of collaborators.

Beside these principal shortcomings there were many other minor defects in the planning and the conduct of the war.

The answer to all these problems was that the provisional government should have shifted inside Bangladesh into a liberated area. Sector Headquarters and all officers should have left Indian territory and taken position inside Bangladesh. I put forward this suggestion and Major Zia readily agreed with me. We took the decision that all commands should be moved inside the border. We wanted that other sectors should do the same at an appointed time. Accordingly a conference of sector commanders was held. Colonel Osmani, Major Khaled Mushaffaf, and major Safiullah opposed the proposal. Not only were we prevented from moving sector headquarters inside Bangladesh and off Indian territory, but Major Zia's Brigade was taken away from my sector.

I was left with one Air Force officer, Flight Lieutenant Hamidullah and one battle injured officer, second Lieutenant Mannan. Only one jeep was left for transport. At the time Brigadier Singh[Indian Army] through he would be able to direct us as we were left with no resources. He suggested we set up Headquarters along with his H.Q. at Turag, which was 40 miles away from the border. I should mention here that most of sector Headquarters were well inside India. Most of our sector commanders used carpets to cover their tent floors.

I refused Brigadier Singh's offer and set my Sector H.Q. 800 yards off and opposite Kamalpur port. I knew well that I must concentrate on the access which would give us final victory. The access was Kamalpur, Jamalpur, Tangail and Dacca.

Here I would like to mention a freedom fighter called Subedar Aftab. When I reached sector 11, I was told Subedar Aftab is a rebel. He never listen to anybody's orders. He had stationed himself at a place called Kudal Kati in Roumari Thana. He never reported to Major Zia or Brigadier Singh in spite of repeated orders. I was curious about him and I decided to go and meet this man. I walked 18 miles to reach Kudal Kati and on reaching there I found Subedar Aftab waiting for me. He smartly saluted me and said 'I accept you as my commander, because you are the first one who never ever come to me to see for myself when I have done.'

The chairman of the Tribunal breaks in. Taher responds, "These portions are very relevant. You ( speaking to the chairman) were not in the Liberation War, how would you have any idea about freedom fighters?" Taher continues.

" Subedar Aftab informed me that he was the one who kept a vast area of Roumari Thana liberated and it remained so until the 16th December. Throughout he refused to go to India territory to establish a base. I spent the night talking with him. I found that he was a natural leader of men and I found myself very small in front of him.

When he said he could do anything, I proposed to attack to dislodge the Pakistanis who had entrenched themselves on an island in front of his position. There was a river between the two. The island on which the Pakistanis had taken up their position was divided in two halves by a small canal. Subedar Aftab and I crossed the river with a ferry boat and found the Pakistanis on the furthest side. The near side was covered with thick elephant grass. I advised that a company of fighters cross the river at night and taken up position inside the elephant grass on the bank of the small canal. I suggested that early in the morning a small patrol should go out and allow the Pakistani forces to chase them. After four days Aftab was ready with his plan.

As expected the Pakistanis attacked after the early morning patrol. Their units were drawn within the killing zone of the freedom fighters. In the first attack the Pakistanis suffered a large number of casualties. The Pakistanis launched a second and third attack, both of which were repulsed. They panicked and abandoned the position. With this the whole of Roumari Thana right up to Bakadurab came within our position.

Next we turned our attention to Chilmari, a battle that is well known and which I commanded. It was in the middle of September. During one night 1200 freedom fighters crossed the Brahmuputra river. The target was guarded by two companies of Pakistani regulars supplements by a large number of Razakars. We held Chilmari under our control for 24 hours and returned with a huge quantity of arms and ammunition, and a large number of prisoners. It was a daring raid, one of those that are rare in the history of warfare.

From September pnword much of the news of the liberation war was broadcast from the radio in our sector. Even the American journalist, Jack Anderson, noted the contribution being made in our area. He said, 'with the fall of Kamalpur the Pakistanis lost the war.' It was while leading the attack on Kamalpur that I lost my leg. Our units were the first to reach Dacca.

It is here that I would like to mention my brother because there appears to be a deliberate attempt to victimize our family. My brother, Abu Yusuf Khan, an accused in this case, was in Saudi Arabia on deputation with the Saudi Air Force when the Liberation War broke out. He escaped and joined the battle in our sector. No matter how it may sound today, I will say there were many Bengali officers at that base, but no others escaped to join the war. Instead they returned to West Pakistan and were later repatriated to Bangladesh in 1973. My brother distinguished himself in the battle of Jamalpur and was awarded the Bir Bikram. He was the first one to reach the Pakistani Command Headquarters on the 16th December and obtained the surrender of General Niazi. He is the proud possessor of General Niazi's car flag. To me it seems the world has known  few better men.

My brother Anwar is also an accused in this case. He is a lecturer at Dacca University. During the liberation War he was a staff officer at Sector 11 H.Q. He is the type who would refuse to have a second shirt just because a freedom fighter or a refigee needed one. I must also mention my brother Bahar whom we recently lost along with three other heroic boys due to the treachery of the present government. He commanded a company of more than 200 boys and by November had liberated the major part of Netrakona Sub-Division. Due to his exceptional bravery he was twice awarded the gallantry award Bir-Pratic. He, too, is our national hero. My brother Belal, who also could not escape the treachery of this government has been brought here as an accused. He was awarded the Bir Pratic twice. Six brothers and two sisters - we all took part in the Liberation War.............  Due to our involvement in the struggle , our village was ransacked. My parents were taken as prisoners at Mymensingh.

When speaking about the Liberation War I must mention the loyalty, the courage, and the patriotism of our freedom fighters. The nation found its best people in them. How unfortunate it is that the maker did not make use of them. I must also mention the poor and the villagers who gave us food, who gave us shelter, who supplied us information on enemy positions, and who were constantly an inspiration to us. I had a weapon in my hand. They had none. In helping us they faced Pakistani bullets, their houses were burnt, and their women folk disgraced. They were the most courageous of all and it is to them that I will always give my deepest loyalty.

In the month of April 1972, after all necessary treatment following the amputation was completed, I returned to Bangladesh. I rejoined the Bangladesh Army in the position of Adjutant General. I reinforced discipline in the Army when it was a difficult task. The Chairman of this Tribunal is a witness to how I initiated disciplinary proceedings against certain senior officers, such as Brigadier Mir Sawkat and Major General Safiullaah concerning certain illegalities. My position was that everything any officer had illegally acquired must be returned, so that they may stand up as brave and clean men before the nation's freedom fighters.

I never compromised with these principles. Within the few months I was posted as the new Commander of the 44th Brigade at Comilla. On assuming command of Comilla Brigade, I asked my officers to return everything they had illegally acquired during and after the Liberation War. My officers complied with my orders and I had a set of officers whose consciences were completely clear.

This is what I regarded as leadership. I always sought to appeal to what was good in men. I detested and avoided taking advantage of the weakness of an individual or of our nation.

My effort at the Comilla Brigade to raise and organize an Army on the lines of a "People's army" is well-known among different sectors of the Army. I constantly tried to develop a strong army based on those who had fought for freedom. Our organizing principle was that of a "productive army" where officers and men worked as do peasants and workers. We ploughed our own fields, grew our own food, and went to the villages to join in production. This was the path to self-reliance. It is with happiness that I recall that within a very short time my officers in the Comilla Brigade understood these principles and turned our unit into a productive  force.

At the same time I resisted and protested to the then Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, regarding the existence of a secret treaty with India and also regarding the raising of the paramilitary Rakhi Bahini. In army Headquarters there is documentary evidence of my protest. It is on these two points and due to my insistence for a complete and total departure from the existing Colonial pattern of the Army that differences arose within the government.

As a consequence Lieutenant-Colonel Ziauddin and myself found it necessary to dissociate ourselves from the Army. This occurred in the month of November 1972. It is with relief that I hear this morning from the Chairman of this tribunal that Lieutenant-Colonel Ziauddin is now at an accused in this case.

In 1973 I took up a job with the Ministry of Flood Control and Water Resources as Director of the Dredger Organization. I took the job at a time when the organization had already been absolutely shattered due to corruption and mismanagement. Within a short time we revived the organization which achieved its highest income since its creation in 1952. From the watchman to the Superintendant of Engineers you can ask how I was running that organization.

Taher says following an interruption of his statement: "Mr. chairman and the Honourable Members of this court - I must bring everything out. It will bring you close to me........"

"On the 15th August 1975, Sheikh Mujib was killed by a group of officers and a section of the Army. On that day early in the morning an officer from the Second Field Artillery rang me up and gave me a message which he said came from Major Rashid. He asked me to go to Bangladesh Betar (Bangladesh Radio). He also informed me of the killing of Sheikh Mujib.

I turned on the radio and come to know that Sheikh Mujib had been killed and that Khondakar Mustaque had taken power. This was shocking news to me. I thought it would create political instability and that in this situation we could even lose our independence. Meanwhile, several telephone calls came urging me to go to Bangladesh Betar. I thought I should go and see the situation.

At 9 a.m. in the morning, I reached Bangladesh Betar. On reaching there I was taken by Major Rashid to a room where I found Khondakar Mustaque and Taheruddin Thakur along with Major Dalim and Major-General M. Khalilur Rahman. I had a brief discussion with Khondakar Mustaque and emphasized that the need of the hour was to protect the country's independence. I was taken to another room by Major Rashid where he asked me whether I would like to join the Cabinet. I told him to get hold of all the Chiefs of the defence Forces, discuss the problems with them, and to reach a suitable solution. Major Rashid insisted that I, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Ziauddin, could save the situation and that he had no faith in any service chief or my politician. I advised him that no BAKSAL leaders should be taken into any cabinet and I said an all party government composed of all patriotic political parties should be formed. Rashid kept insisting I attend the swearing in ceremony of Khondakar Mustaque at Banga Bhavan.

At 11.30 I left Bangladesh Betar with a feeling of deep concern. I sensed that some outside power was involved in the killing of the father of the nation.

When I reached Banga Bhavan at mid-day, the swearing in ceremony was over. In the evening I sat down with the officers who were involved in the killing. They were headed by Major Rashid. I put forward my suggestion that Martial Law be proclaimed, the constitution be abrogated, and that all political parties be allowed to function and that a general election of the people establish a people's government. I insisted that the release of all political prisoners must be done immediately before any firm future course of action could be decided.

During the latter part of our discussion, I called General Zia to join in our discussion. All agreed with my suggestions and considered in the only suitable course open in the present. The next day I had a long discussion with Major-General Safiullah, Major-General M. Khalilur Rahman. They all agreed to what I had recommended.

But at that stage on the 16th of August, I realized that Major Rashid and Major Farooque were using my name opportunistically to give their troops the impression that they were with me. On the 17th of August it became clear to me that the whole game was backed by the United States of America and Pakistan. I also understood that Khondakar Mustaque was directly involved in the killing of Sheikh Mujib. This group, it was also clear, had a pre-determined course set for themselves.

From the 17th onwards I stopped going to Banga Bhavan. General Osmani was appointed Military Advisor to Khondakar Mustaque and kept in close touch with me. He took me a along with him to various places in Bangladesh and Constantly asked me to contact Lieutenant-Colonel Ziauddin. I told him that the government first must withdraw the death warrant which had been issued against Ziauddin's life by the Mujib government. Only then would Ziauddin emerge from living underground.

In the last part of September, Major Rashid brought a message from president Khondakar Mustaque Ahmed that I and Lieutenant-Colonel Ziauddin should form a political party and that he would provide all facilities of finance. I rejected his proposal and sent back word that I insisted upon the release of all political prisoners. It was clear that Mustaque had absolutely no political base. But for a small fraction, he had no support in the Army as a whole, and he had no support among the people.

It was in this situation that Brigadier Khaled Mussarraf took the advantage and came to power on the 3rd of November 1975. On that day I was ill and confined to bed at my house in Narayanganj. Yet, early in the morning of that day at 4 o'clock I received a telephone call. It was Major-General Ziaur Rahman who implored me to help him. He could not finish our talk - the line was cut. On the same day many soldiers, N.C.O's and J.C.O's came to my Narayanganj house. I was unable to speak with all of them, but I talked with a few in my room. They informed me that Khaled Mussarraf's coup was backed by the Indians and that BAKSAL forces were attempting to take power again. They also informed me that tensions between the Bengal Regiment and the core troops were rising very high. At any moment there could be shooting. I advised them to go back to the cantonment and not to shoot each other whatever the provocation. The general situation in the country after the 3rd of November is well known to all. People believed Khaled Mussarraf was backed by the Indias. On 4th November the victory march of BAKSAL leaders and workers together with the jubilation over India radio proved it was backed by the Indians. The people of Bangladesh were not prepared to accept this. They thought that we were losing their sovereignty.

At this stage of the Crisis, it is understandable that Major-General Zia resigned. He was being kept under house arrest and he was forced to resign. What is not understandable is why Rear-Admiral M.H Khan and Air-Vice Marshall M.G. Tawab assisted Khaled Mussarraf in assuming the rank of Major-General while the very sovereignty of the country was at stake. These chiefs of the forces behaved in a cowardly manner. This nation cannot afford the luxury of keeping such cowards as their service chiefs.

On the afternoon of the 4th November a message reached me from Major -General Zia through one of his relatives. He appealed to me to use my influence with the troops to rescue him and save the sovereignty of the country. In the meantime many soldiers, N.C.O's were coming to me. On the 6th November I appealed through representatives of all units in the Dacca cantonment for the troops to come out of their barracks with weapons to rescue Ziaur Rahman. At 1.20 a.m. I first heard the sound of firing. Soon after the shooting began trucks loaded with soldiers came to me - shouting for me. They informed me they had acted as I had asked. Zia had been rescued and was being kept in the Second Field Artillery Headquarters. They came to take me there. At about 3 a.m. we reached the H.Q. of the Second Field Artillery Regiment.

I found Zia in his night dress with Brigadier Mir Shawkat and a few other officers and troops. Zia embraced me, embraced my brother and with tears in his eyes, expressed his gratitude for saving him. We then had some discussion regarding the course of action to be taken.

The Tribunal interrupts taher. There are arguments in the court. Taher says: " You must listen to what I have to say. Otherwise I will not make any statement. Hang me ...... Hang me now...... I have no fear. But don't disturb me ..... from where did we leave off Sahrif?" He continued with his statement.

I wanted Zia to take over as chief Martial Law Administrator and accordingly an announcement was made on the radio. I had instructed the soldiers to assemble at the Shahid Minar where a mess meeting would be addressed by Zia and myself, so that no one would be able to go back from the commitment they had made to the revolutionary soldiers – the soldiers who, minus their officers, had protected the sovereignty of the country.

 I set the time for the meeting at Shahid Minar for 10 o' clock. The soldiers out of joy were moving through the town and through it would take some time to gather. At 8:30 I was informed by the troops that Khondakar Mustaque Ahmed had entered Bangladesh Radio and was attempting to make a speech. I went to the Radio station. I told Mustaque in clear terms that the days of political conspiracy were over and that he must leave the radio station immediately. He complied with my orders and left.

After that I went to the cantonment to bring Zia to address the meeting. When I reached there, I found the atmosphere was a little changed. Zia had shaved and was in uniform. He seemed to have recovered from the shock of his captivity. When I told him it was time to go to the Shahid Minar, he refused – although very politely. He pleaded that he was a soldier and that he need not go out and speak in a public meeting. He asked me to go and address the troops. Instead I sent a message to the Shahid Minar for the troops to return to the Cantonment.

At 11 0'clock we held a meeting at Headquarters. He decided in principle to form an interim government. Present at that meeting were myself, Zia, Tawab, M.H. Khan, M. Khalilur Rahman, Osmani, and the principal Secretary Mahbubul Alam Chashi. A legal question arose over the continuity of the government. The others wanted Justice Sayem to be the president of the country. [Sayem had been appointed by Khaled Mussarraf on 5^th November]. I agreed to that but wanted Zia to be the chief Martial Law Administrator. After some discussion in Which Zia balked at becoming C.M.L.A. it was decided that he, along with Tawab and M.H. Khan, would each be appointed Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators. It was not decided in that meeting that they would hold charge of my ministry. Justice Sayem as President and chief Martial Law Administrator along with his three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators would from an advisory council. But most important of all it was decided that all political prisoners were to be released.

After a discussion with political leaders, political activities were to be allowed and a general election would be held earlier than what was promised by president Khondakar Mustaque.

In the afternoon I went to the Radio station. The soldiers who had taken part in this revolution wanted me present when they handed over their "Twelve Points" to Major-General Zia. From the radio station I telephoned Ziaur Rahman and informed him of the soldiers' wish. At the time the troops were so excited they did not allow anyone inside the radio station. In the evening at about 7:45 Sayem and Mustaque who accompanied Zia were not allowed inside the radio station. Only after representatives of the revolutionary soldiers had handed the Twelve Points to Zia who acknowledged his agreement by signing a copy, were Sayem and Mustaque permitted inside.

Major-General Zia and myself sat down in the T.V. room fo radio Bangladesh and watched Khondakar Mustaque and Sayem speak to the nation. Sayem spelled out clearly the principles which had been agreed upon in the earlier meeting. In keeping with these principles, on the 8^th November 1976 Major Jalil and A.S.M. Abdur Rab were releases from prison. On the 8^th I rang up General Zia thanking him for this act and insisted that Matin, Alauddin, Tipu Biswas and other prisoners be released on the same day.

On 8^th November in the evening  I was informed by Zia that there were some incidents involving the killing of officers. I offered him all necessary help in bringing this situation under control. I also offered to move immediately up to the Cantonment and informed him that my orders to the soldiers taking part in the revolution had been that no officer should be hurt in this manner. Until the 11^th November, Major-General Zia kept in constant contact with me. After the 12^th I found he was unavailable.

On the 23^rd of November, a large police contingent surrounded the house of my brother and took him to the police control room. When I came to know this, I rang up Major-General Zia and I was told that he was not available. Instead of him, Major-General Ershad, the Deputy chief Martial Law Administrator talked with me. When I informed him about the arrest of my brother, he said that it was a police action and they knew nothing about it. It became very clear to me that a new Conspiracy taken control of those we had bought to power on November 7^th.

On 24^th November I was surrounded by a large contingent of police. The police officer asked me to accompany him to have a discussion with Zia. I said I was surprised and I asked him why there was need of a police guard for me to go to Zia. Anyway they put me in a jeep and drove me straight to this jail. This is how I was put inside this jail by those traitors who I saved and bought to power.

In our history, there is only example of such treachery. It was the treachery of Mir Zafar who betrayed the people of Bangladesh and the subcontinent and led us into slavery for a period of 200 years. Fortunately for us it is not 1757. It is 1976 and we have revolutionary soldiers and a revolutionary people who will destroy the conspiracy of traitors like Ziaur Rahman.

Once more Taher is stopped by the Tribunal. Procedures are stopped by arguments in the court. Taher declares: "You have no power to hang me. No power to convict or acquit me."

After a few days in the Central jail, I was flown by helicopter to Rajshahi Central jail. There I was put in solitary confinement. My family members were kept from meeting me.

Meanwhile, our country faced two important problems. One was that a large number of workers of a particular political party went over to India and started carrying out armed action along border. The second was India's stopping of the flow of water down the Ganges by use of the Farakka barrage. Both these action were a direct threat to the sovereignty and economy of our country. In spite of my incarceration, my solitary confinement, and the accompanied harrassment, I did not fail to register my protest against this threat. On the 10^th May 1976 I wrote a letter to the president of the country which I would like to read out of this court.

Taher is not allowed by the court to read the letter. The Tribunal also says it will not allow to give his statement unless he promises to cut it short. After the intervention by Taher's senior lawyers, he was allowed to speak. Taher's advocate said to the court: "Please allow him. It is the discretion of the tribunal not to, but because he is the principal accused, he must be allowed no matter how elaborately to make clear his contention before you."

Mr. Chairman and honourable Members of the court, my letter to the president is the manifesto of a men's desire to protect the sovereignty of his country from foreign aggression.

I am a free man. I have earned that freedom from my deeds. The high walls of this jail, solitary confinement, and handcuffs, cannot take away that freedom.

On the 22^nd of May I was flown from Rajshahi jail and brought into this jail. Since my arrival I had heard that I would be tried by a Military Tribunal inside this jail. On the 15^th June the present tribunal which is trying me, visited the jail. I refused to attend because a Military Tribunal inside a jail is only an instrument of the government to commit crimes in the name of justice.

On the 21^st of June, four lawyers went to my cell and assured me on behalf of the tribunal that justice would be done and the tribunal would function without intimidation from the government. Only on that assurance I agreed to appear before this court.

But I would like to mention here the ordinance under which this tribunal is constituted. It was promulgated on the 15^th June 1976. Yet, the tribunal itself was constituted well before the promulgation of the ordinance, otherwise, how could the tribunal have visited the jail on the 15^th June. Moreover, the preparation of the court room inside the jail began on the 12^th June.

Mr. Chairman and Honourable Members of the Tribunal, law is not a law unless it is a good law aiming at the good of the people and the good of the country. The ordinance promulgated on 15^th June 1976 is a black law. It was promulgated merely to suit the designs of the government. The ordinance is illegal. So this tribunal ceases to have any right legally or morally to try me.

I would like to describe the events which have occurred since 21^st June 1976, the day this trial opened. Taher is not allowed to give this section of his statement. He says he has never seen men of such low integrity as the Chairman and the members of the Tribunal.

The act of this Tribunal has put to shame what good things human civilization achieved through constant endeavour from the beginning of time until today.

Before I conclude I would like to say that I have stated in detail what occurred on the night of the 6^th/7^th of November and also the day of the 7^th November. This tribunal will understand now as to why I have asked for Sayem, Zia, M.H. Khan, Tawab, and Osmani to appear as witnesses. Let them come and say if there be anything is not true that I have stated to this tribunal.

I would like to say a few words about the defence personnel who have been brought here a long with me as accused. I have a responsibility towards them. I was one of top ranking officers in the Bangladesh Army in its formative period. It pains me to see that now this Military Junta in order to achieve their malicious design will sacrifice such an important part of our army and thereby disable the armed forces.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I will only say that I love my country and my people. I am part of the soul of this nation. I ask if you be part of the same soul that you protect it as if it were your own. And I warn this tribunal as I warn the corrupt gentry of this country, do not dare my life. If you do, you will burn the soul of this nation.

Victory to the revolution!

Victory to my people!

Long Live Bangladesh!

Abu Taher was hanged at 4 a.m. on the morning of July 21, 1976 in Dacca Central Jail.

© 2003; Colonel Taher Sangsad and Joya Taher
General Secretary (Colonel Taher Sangsad): tahersangsad@col-taher.com  Joya Taher: joya_taher@col-taher.com